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BEYOND DEPENDENCE AND LEGACY: SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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1) INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa is too readily dismissed from the outside, but the regional perception is often one of optimism. It is an area rich in natural resources: ranging from oil and natural gas to other minerals such as chrome, nickel and zinc. Nearly half the population are under the age of 14, making the region free from the demographic burden of an ageing workforce prevalent in other parts of the world. There are also promising beginnings to regional approaches to tackling shared security problems; with the draft framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy being a good example of this.

However, it is undeniable that sub-Saharan Africa does face considerable difficulties. It contains only 10% of the world's population but is the location of 90% of world malaria cases and home to 67% of world HIV sufferers. Conflict, famine, genocide and disease have all plagued the region over recent decades. Of all the regions of the developing world, sub-Saharan Africa remains the most marginalised and least likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Colonial powers, corrupt leaders and, to an extent, the NGO/aid complex have all contributed to the region's difficulties.

This report is based on the outcomes of a consultation that Oxford Research Group (ORG) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) held in South Africa in December 2008. Bringing together security experts, academics, former government officials and civil society leaders from across sub-Saharan Africa, the two-day meeting explored the implications of the sustainable security framework for the region (see Appendix I for a list of participants). All the participants attended in a personal capacity and this report does not necessarily represent a consensus view or the view of any individual participant, organisation or government. The Ford Foundation-funded consultation was the third in a series of six regional meetings to be held over 2008-09 as part of ORG's *Moving Towards Sustainable Security* programme.

Sub-Saharan Africa includes all the countries of the African continent that are located, either fully or partially, to south of the Sahara. This vast and diverse region ranges from Mali, Chad and parts of Sudan in the north, to Botswana and South Africa in the south. It is distinct in many ways from the countries of North Africa, which are considered part of the Arab world – though there will be clear overlap with some of those countries that were included in the regional consultation for the Middle East and North Africa.

As each of the regional consultations take place, a set of coherent proposals will emerge that can be fed directly into the policy-making processes in Europe and the United States, as well as inform the development of regional security policies that can be promoted by partner organisations around the world.

2) SUSTAINABLE SECURITY

As in much of the world, the current security discourse in sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by what might be called the 'control paradigm': an approach based on the false premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo. The most obvious global example of this approach has been the so-called 'war on terror', which essentially aimed to 'keep the lid' on terrorism and insecurity, without addressing the root causes.

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Such approaches to national, regional and international security are deeply flawed, and are distracting the world's politicians from developing realistic and sustainable solutions to the non-traditional threats facing the world.

In contrast, this report explores an alternative approach, that of 'sustainable security'. The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. In other words, 'fighting the symptoms' will not work, you must instead 'cure the disease'. Such a framework must be based on **an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses**.

Sustainable security focuses on the interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity, including:

- **Climate change:** Loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples, leading to civil unrest, intercommunal violence and international instability.
- **Competition over resources:** Competition for increasingly scarce resources – including food, water and energy – especially from unstable parts of the world.
- **Marginalisation of the majority world:** Increasing socio-economic divisions and the political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world's population.
- **Global militarisation:** The increased use of military force as a security measure and the further spread of military technologies (including CBRN weapons).

All of these trends are present in the African security dynamic, as demonstrated in the next section of this report. The sustainable security analysis makes a distinction between these trends and other security threats, which might instead be considered symptoms of the underlying causes and tend to be more localised and immediate (for example terrorism or organised crime). It promotes a comprehensive, systemic approach, taking into account the interaction of different trends which are generally analysed in isolation by others. It also places particular attention on how the current behaviour of international actors and western governments is contributing to, rather than reducing, insecurity.

Sustainable security goes beyond analysis of threats to the development of a framework for new security policies. It takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; bold, visible and substantial steps towards nuclear disarmament (and the control of biological and chemical weapons); and a shift in defence spending to focus on the non-military elements of security. This takes into account the underlying structural problems in national and international systems and the institutional changes that are needed to develop and implement effective solutions. It also links long-term global drivers to the immediate security pre-occupations of ordinary people at a local level (such as corruption or violent crime).

By aiming to cooperatively resolve the root causes of threats using the most effective means available, sustainable security is inherently preventative in that it addresses the likely causes of conflict and instability well before the ill-effects are felt. In doing so, it incorporates and builds upon many elements of previous important attempts to reframe the way we think about security, including:

- **Common security:** Security is dependent on cooperation, demilitarisation and mutual trust.
- **Comprehensive security:** Security must go beyond military defence, and take into account the other social, environmental and economic issues that are vital to national stability.
- **Human security:** A people-centred, rather than state-centred, view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability.
- **Just security:** Security is dependent on international institutions and the rule of law.
- **Non-traditional security:** Governments must move beyond defining security in terms of relationships among nation states and address newly developing trends and transnational security threats.

3) DRIVERS OF INSECURITY

While there are many immediate security concerns in the region, there are perhaps three principal drivers of insecurity over the medium- to long-term:

- **The nature of the state**
- **Legacies of war and militarism**
- **Resource management**

a) The nature of the state

The borders of many sub-Saharan African nation states are largely a legacy of European colonisation. In addition, the significant control and power that the colonial powers wielded over populations has often been continued by post-colonial states. In many cases the state has been imposed, with democratic processes subverted in the interests of incumbent leaders or tribal dominance. Even where a change of government does occur, those previously marginalised by those in power often take on similar characteristics once in power themselves (in what could be described as the 'our turn to eat' phenomena). Such states, including Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, are characterised by weak institutions, predatory dictatorships and endemic corruption and have consequently been the most serious source of insecurity in the region.

Weak states in sub-Saharan Africa are unable to effectively manage resources or implement policies to promote sustainable societal growth. The resulting socio-economic conditions leave much of the population marginalised and contribute to a climate where crime and violence thrive, with Somalia being perhaps the most obvious current example of this. In Zimbabwe, poor governance has caused the country to suffer astronomical rates of inflation, as high as 11.2 million percent. Between August 2008 and March 2009 over 4,000 people died as a result of a cholera outbreak triggered by the collapse of water and sanitation management in major cities and over 5 million people face desperate food shortages at the time of writing.

Where resources are utilised for wealth generation, neo-patrimonial practises ensure that small, powerful cliques emerge with large stakes in maintaining the status quo and relatively little regard for the general population. Unfortunately, foreign aid further sustains these powerful elites. During the cold war the aid complex was often criticised for being too centralised and for propping up corrupt regimes; now, the often-uncoordinated activities of the numerous NGOs and aid agencies have become too fragmented whilst still unintentionally propping up regimes by providing the services that they neglect. Donor countries, in turn, provide the centralised support that maintains the position of such governments.

The ruling regimes within these weak states employ norms inherited from colonial powers, including the exploitation of ethnic divisions for the purpose of divide and rule. In a region characterised by diverse populations, policies of this kind can be extremely dangerous: the violence that followed Kenya's December 2007 elections led to the deaths of 1,200 people and represents just one of many recent incidents of ethnic violence. A particularly virulent form of the control paradigm, discussed earlier, is utilised by many ruling elites in order to maintain security. Political activists campaigning for democratic reform or social justice often face harassment, imprisonment and violence at the hands of government security forces. In Cameroon, for example, dissent is regularly suppressed through violence or abuse of the country's legal system, whilst in Chad some government opponents have been subjected to extreme violence whilst others have simply 'disappeared'.

It should, however, be acknowledged that attempts to address these issues have taken place at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) continues to work towards addressing governance issues and the SADC *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections* represents a useful blueprint for free and fair elections.

Despite the various initiatives and mechanisms that have been developed, the responsibility for implementation ultimately falls on national governments that, due to a lack of political will, often fail to make the necessary reforms. Regional organisations have also failed to exert the required pressure on individual governments to do so – often because of the fear of individual national representatives that they may be forced to follow suit at a later date.

b) Legacies of war and militarism

Armed conflict has resulted in a huge loss of life in sub-Saharan Africa. The *Millennium Development Goals Report 2005* estimated that between 1994 and 2003, 9.21 million people in the region lost their lives as a result of armed conflict – this represents 70% of all conflict related casualties around the world. Ongoing conflicts continue to impact on large parts of the population, and their effects are magnified by the legacy of past conflict and the resulting culture and institutions of violence.

Conflict and power struggles have rewarded the strongest and increased the prevalence of violence as the primary means of interaction in many parts of the region. A sense of 'might is right' has developed, with the 'strong-man' at the centre of political and social processes. Many of the national liberation movements that fought for independence during the colonial period were necessarily secretive, ruthless and highly militarised. Once in power these characteristics often remained in place and have similarly passed on to contemporary opposition movements, which often take the form of violent paramilitary rebel groups.

Such groups are easily armed due to the large numbers of small arms and light weapons prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this weaponry entered the region during the Cold War from Soviet Union or US sources for use in proxy wars. Since the end of the Cold War, the flow of arms has continued, with arms companies and transnational criminal organisations (or individual arms dealers operating somewhere between the two) earning fortunes by trading the surplus arms supplies of ex-Warsaw Pact countries with rebel groups and, in many cases, the governments with which they fight.

The United States, United Kingdom and France accounted for 60% of the legal international arms trade to the African continent in 2008, and China is playing an increasingly controversial role. Although responsible for the global increase in militarism and for the spread of military technologies to the continent of Africa, this legal arms trade has become better regulated over the last decade. However, loopholes continue to be exploited at the fringes and the illicit arms trade continues to ensure that a steady flow of small arms and light weapons are able to enter sub-Saharan Africa. Local mechanisms developed to address this problem include the SADC Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials, the Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms, and the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export, Manufacture and Sale of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, together with various civil society and NGO initiatives. However, ongoing instability and a lack of commitment to implementing various measures means that such initiatives are often ineffective.

The arms trade aids the development of 'war economies', often sustained through proceeds generated by the control of mineral resources, in which violent entrepreneurs are able to dominate the social economy. The development of such economies often perpetuates conflicts beyond their political beginnings to struggles over the generated revenue and associated power from controlling natural resources. Darfur, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and much of West Africa have all suffered in recent years as a result of this dynamic.

Although there are regular attempts to bring about an end to conflict, they all-too-often represent little more than an opportunity for both sides to regroup, recruit and resupply. Where sustained peace agreements are negotiated they rarely do enough to tackle the culture of violence that has developed, although exceptions include the Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP), which brought about an end to 15 years of civil war in Mozambique and was followed by successful disarmament and demobilisation. In many

cases, though, the failure of national governments to appropriately accommodate and reintegrate ex-combatants at the end of conflict creates the conditions for incipient rebel movements to re-emerge as well as large numbers of potential fighters. Disarmament and demobilisation programmes in both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda have been fraught with difficulties and success has been limited. In DRC, for example, efforts by the Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER) to integrate former rebels into the national army has weakened the army and caused it to take on some of the negative characteristics of the rebel movement.

Holistic approaches towards Security Sector Reform (SSR) have gained increased prominence over the last decade. Such approaches include: Security, Safety and Access to Justice (SSAJ); Peace Support Operations (PSO); control and reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and, controversially, the use of Private Military Companies (PMCs). Despite regional, international and bilateral efforts, fearing for their personal and political safety, ruling regimes are often reluctant to implement such reforms that would do much to break the cycle of violence. The killing of Joao Bernardo Vieira, President of Guinea-Bissau, by members of the country's military in March 2009 will do little to alleviate these fears. In other cases, attempts at SSR may actually strengthen the state security apparatus, which can then be utilised against the general population.

c) Resource management

Sub-Saharan Africa does not lack natural resources – contained within the region are large deposits of oil, gold and diamonds as well as other mineral resources. It is the control and management of these resources and the conflict generated by the various overlapping interest groups that has contributed to insecurity. The primary reason for this has been the misappropriation of the wealth generated by natural resources. Mineral resources have fuelled war economies and foreign companies in the developed world have often been willing to overlook the origins of their commodities. Civil wars in both Angola and Liberia were funded to a large extent by the diamond trade whilst conflict in the DRC is sustained through the wealth generated by a variety of resources, ranging from aluminium and cadmium to timber, copper and zinc.

Although fighting over control of natural resources often sustains conflict, the mismanagement of natural resources by national governments is also a key driver of insecurity and conflict in its own right. The revenues generated by resources are often used for personal enrichment or grandiose projects rather than for the development of sustainable revenue generating infrastructure. In addition, the fiscal dependence of many African states on a limited number of natural resources has exacerbated the deformities of the post-colonial state by removing incentives to provide welfare to the vast majority of the population, which remains untaxable and therefore of little economic importance to the political class.

The interest of foreign nations and companies in African resources also has negative impacts. The growth of China and associated increased demands of the expanding Chinese middle classes for consumer goods and motor vehicles has led to greater competition for resources. Concerns over the issue of peak oil have further contributed to what has been described as a global 'scramble for resources', with much of this scramble taking place in Africa. Between 2002 and 2003, Chinese trade with Africa doubled to \$18.5 billion; by 2007 it had reached \$73 billion. In order to secure contracts for Chinese companies, China has courted sub-Saharan national governments with a mixture of diplomacy and unconditional loans and aid. This unconditional aid props up governments without necessarily filtering down and benefiting the greater population. Although sub-Saharan Africa has benefited from Chinese investment in a variety of infrastructure projects, these projects are primarily carried out using Chinese labour that denies the recipient countries the benefit of jobs and knowledge transfer. However, it should be noted that such unconditional financing is often welcomed within the region, as it does not come with the stipulations usually attached to EU and other foreign aid.

Although China's sub-Saharan African interests have drawn much attention, the interests of other countries and transnational corporations have also contributed to issues surrounding the management of resources. As well as propping up corrupt regimes, too often the actions of foreign companies in Africa are primarily extractive. The region is seen as a supplier of raw materials, which are exported for processing elsewhere removing the added-value generated by the manufacturing and service industries. The development of these secondary and tertiary industries in the region is hampered by a lack of will amongst foreign businesses to invest. The conditions that contribute to this reluctance to invest are to a large extent driven by the nature of the state, which, ironically, is supported by the current extractive form of investment. The short-termism and kleptocratic tendencies of many states have, in addition, prevented revenues from natural resources being invested into more long-term sustainable industries.

The net result is a situation where, despite an abundance of natural resources, the population of much of sub-Saharan Africa remain amongst the poorest in the world. As population levels continue to increase the need to address these issues will become even more acute. The impact of climate change, which will hit sub-Saharan Africa particularly hard, with major implications for the viability of agriculture (both in the commercial and subsistence sectors), could exacerbate existing problems to a level of unprecedented humanitarian disaster unless mitigating measures are put in place now. Tragically, the current mismanagement of resources and other factors have contributed to such widespread poverty that for many in the region, the impact of climate change is considered of little immediate significance. If sub-Saharan Africa is to survive the impending climate crisis then significant development and climate-proofing of infrastructure, agriculture and industry must take place. Governments must leverage the existence of resources within the region against the increasing resource demands from the developed world and ensure the benefits are sustainable and shared by all.

4) BLOCKAGES TO CHANGE

Many of the drivers outlined above can be addressed and mechanisms put in place to resolve the long-term causes of insecurity in Africa. However, there are three major, though not insurmountable, blockages to achieving such a change:

- **The negative perception and treatment of Africa**
- **Weak leadership and poor governance**
- **Lack of regional coherence and identity**

There is a great deal of overlap and integration between each of key drivers of insecurity outlined in the previous section. Together these issues create core structural problems that have locked the region into a cycle of poverty and insecurity. This cycle is compounded by the exclusionary treatment of African nations at the international level and negative perceptions about the political, societal and economic situation in the continent as a whole. Despite inroads made towards debt reduction and limited discussions on trade during the Doha round at the WTO, the current global economic crisis has the potential to further marginalise the region as more developed nations focus efforts on their own economic difficulties and propping up the existing economic system, rather than engaging in a fundamental rethink of the way the global economy is managed.

The perception of the region as inherently risky is further perpetuated by the bad news that dominates media headlines and has an impact both inside and outside the region. Foreign tourists are less inclined to visit much of the continent; the World Travel and Tourism Council ranks sub-Saharan Africa towards the bottom of various indices that describe the impact of tourism on regional economies, and holds out little hope for future improvement. Transnational corporations are discouraged from meaningful investment, in part because of these negative perceptions, and where they do invest they often choose to employ contractors from outside the region. Within sub-Saharan Africa, negative perceptions contribute to the problem of 'brain-drain' and many of the brightest and most educated leave to work elsewhere and pursue the opportunities that the region is perceived to lack. This is particularly

dangerous in relation to healthcare workers, with many of the region's doctors and nurses leaving to work in countries like the United Kingdom.

Weak leadership and poor governance only serves to feed this negative perception. As described, various initiatives have taken place with the aim of addressing the key drivers of insecurity outlined in this report. However, all too often it is the issue of ratification and implementation that hampers the success of such initiatives. In many cases, national governments have a greater stake in maintaining the status quo than facilitating change. Where there is political will, weak leadership, corruption and existing poor state institutions prevent programmes from properly progressing. In many sub-Saharan nations endemic corruption begins at the centre of political regimes and filters down through several levels of bureaucracy. With civil servants at each level relying on the level above for the maintenance of their position and with many people waiting to fill their roles there is little incentive to speak out and push for change.

Regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the African Union or Southern African Development Community, are perhaps the best channel for addressing issues of governance as well as the wider drivers of insecurity. However, this potential is hindered by a lack of regional cohesion and identity. Where a sense of cohesion does exist, it is often amongst the ruling elites of the sub-Saharan nations rather than the people they represent. Regional organisations, instead of acting at the supranational level, currently represent the collective interests of these elites. For example, rather than condemn the violence in Sudan that has led to the deaths of around 400,000 people, when presented with an opportunity to do so the AU instead underlined its concern that African leaders are unfairly singled out by the international community. In response to efforts by the International Criminal Court to bring President Bashir to justice, the AU issued a communiqué to the UN Security Council requesting court proceedings be halted. Responses of this kind do not seem to represent the interests of the people of Africa.

5) RECOMMENDATIONS

The blockages to change identified above must be urgently addressed in order to allow the development of mechanisms that will ensure the drivers outlined in section three do not remain as sources of insecurity and conflict over the medium- to long-term. Specific initiatives in four key areas include:

- 1) **Increased regional cooperation:** Across Africa, on average, only 7% of trade takes place within regional blocks. Increased internal trade is one area that could provide more legitimacy to and strengthen regional institutions. Significant improvements will need to be made to intra-regional transportation links – including interstate highways and railways – in order to facilitate this. Pan-African media will also be essential in fostering integration, with an 'African Al Jazeera' being one possibility worth exploring. Successful regional and sub-regional cooperation on economic and security issues could then help African nations present a more united front when demanding the substantial debt relief and serious trade reform that the international community has an obligation to provide.
- 2) **Democratic reform:** Much of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is at the mercy of dictatorships or corrupt elites. Only through democratic reform can such governments become more accountable to the people they govern. State structures and processes must be democratised in ways that are meaningful to local people, including improving the freedom of the media and judiciary. Although the rule of law and effective policing is vital, neither the police nor the military should be able to interfere with elections beyond ensuring people are able to vote without fear and that their vote will be counted fairly. Where leaders have become too powerful their mandate should be reduced. Of course this is no easy task and must be pursued through regional initiatives such as a strengthened Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

- 3) **Actual and cultural demilitarisation:** Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform is required in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Where peace is negotiated both DDR and SSR should be built into the process and agreement. In addition to the process of disarmament and demobilisation, the 'culture of violence' inherent in sections of society that have long taken part in conflict must also be tackled. Too often, the reintegration aspect of DDR is overlooked. Local civil society participation is key to reintegration efforts, and women's and church groups may have a strong role to play in such processes.
- 4) **Youth driven change:** If real sustainable change is going to take place it must be driven by civil society and, in particular, the young. It is through this demographic that cultural and political change may be pursued. However, all-too-often the patriarchal culture prevalent in society is reflected in the political system, closing it off to the younger generation. One potential area of development is a youth-driven African Commission on Climate Change, which may help bring young people into the political process, as well as raise the profile of climate change issues and help 'de-westernise' the concept in the minds of many Africans.

Over the next 5-10 years, a radical shift towards sustainable approaches to security will be hugely important. If there is no change in thinking, security policies will continue to be based on the mistaken assumption that the status quo can be maintained: an elite minority can maintain its position, environmental problems can be marginalised, and the lid can be kept on dissent and insecurity. Alternatively, a change in thinking could lead to an era of substantial progress in developing a more socially just and environmentally sustainable regional order for sub-Saharan Africa.

APPENDIX I) LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The following experts participated in the ORG-ISS Regional Sustainable Security Consultation for sub-Saharan Africa, held at Kloofzicht Lodge near Johannesburg, South Africa, from 30 November to 2 December 2008. All the participants attended in a personal capacity and this report does not necessarily represent a consensus view or the view of any individual participant, organisation or government.

REGIONAL PARTICIPANTS

- **Philippe Kadima Cintu (Democratic Republic of Congo)**, SADC Liaison Officer at the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Congo in Pretoria and a former consultant to the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN).
- **Jean-Jaques Cornish (South Africa)**, Journalist and broadcaster for, among others, CNBC Europe, the BBC, Agence France Presse, *The Guardian* and *India Today* and winner of the 2007 SADC award for Radio Journalism.
- **Jean-Marie Gasana (Rwanda)**, independent consultant and researcher in conflict, governance and security, and Advisor to the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER-Africa).
- **Augustine Ikelegbe (Nigeria)**, Research Fellow for Comparative Politics, Environmental Politics and Public Policy Analysis at the University of Benin.
- **Arthur Kepel (Democratic Republic of Congo)**, DRC Analyst at the International Crisis Group and former Head of Intelligence at the UN Mission in Kinshasa.
- **Berouk Mesfin (Ethiopia)**, Senior Researcher in the Direct Conflict Prevention Programme at ISS (Addis Ababa) and former Intelligence Analyst in the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence, Lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University and Research Associate at the Institute of Development Research and Institute of Federal Studies.
- **Gladys Mokhawa (Botswana)**, Lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Botswana and a PhD student of International Relations (Peace and Security) at the University of St Andrews.
- **Takawira Musavengana (Zimbabwe)**, Senior Researcher in the Security Sector Governance Programme at ISS (Pretoria) and formerly worked at the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Namibia, the Africa University in Zimbabwe and for the Parliament of Zimbabwe.
- **Abdulahi A. Osman (Somalia)**, Assistant Professor and Coordinator Minor in African Studies in the International Affairs Department at the University of Georgia.
- **Timothy Othieno (Kenya)**, Research Fellow in the Politics and Governance Programme at the Overseas Development Institute.
- **Medhane Tadesse (Ethiopia)**, Director of the Peace and Security Studies Directorate at the Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue, an Assistant Professor of History and a defence and conflict analyst on the Horn of Africa.

OBSERVER

- **Philippa Drew (UK)**, former Director of Global Issues at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and member of Oxford Research Group's UK Policy Group for Sustainable Security and its Board of Trustees.

FACILITATORS

- **Chris Abbott (UK)**, Deputy Director of Oxford Research Group, Director of ORG's *Moving Towards Sustainable Security* programme and lead author of *Beyond Terror: The Truth About the Real Threats to Our World* (Random House, 2007).
- **Henri Boshoff (South Africa)**, Head of the Training for Peace Programme at IIS (Pretoria), formally a Military Analyst in the African Security Analysis Programme at IIS (Pretoria) and a member of the South African National Defence Force until 2001.

- **Dr Jakkie Cilliers (South Africa)**, Executive Director and co-founder of ISS, Extraordinary Professor in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria and member of the International Advisory Board of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
- **Dr Paul-Simon Handy (Cameroon)**, Head of the African Security Analysis Programme at ISS (Pretoria) and former Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Free University of Berlin.
- **Dr Wafula Okumu (Kenya)**, Senior Research Fellow in the African Security Analysis Programme at ISS (Pretoria) and formerly at McMaster University, the Centre for Peace Studies and an African Union Academic Programme Associate.
- **Dr. John Sloboda (UK)**, Executive Director of Oxford Research Group, Honorary Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London and co-founder of Iraq Body Count.

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